Supreme Court Eases the Burden for Proving Reverse Discrimination Claims

On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Marlean A. Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, vacating the Sixth Circuit’s decision that a plaintiff claiming anti-heterosexual discrimination in the workplace must meet a higher standard of proof. This holding establishes a significant precedent for all reverse discrimination cases under Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), and national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e17 (as amended).

After being employed by the Ohio agency for fifteen years, Ames unsuccessfully applied for a new management position, which was awarded to a lesbian woman. Ames was later demoted from her role as program administrator and a gay man was hired to fill that position. The Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and found that Ames failed to make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive because she had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit was wrong to require Ames to prove “background circumstances” or a pattern of prejudice to support her claim that she was denied a promotion and demoted because she was not a member of the LGBTQ+ community and that her employer was biased toward that community. The Supreme Court further stated that Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination against “any individual” because of a protected characteristic, regardless of whether that person is a member of a majority or minority group. A minority group member would not be required to establish such a pattern and, therefore, a member of a majority group should not be required to either.

At issue in the case was the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which outlines the standard by which a plaintiff in a Title VII case must establish intentional discrimination. Essentially McDonnell Douglas only requires that plaintiffs demonstrate that they are members of a protected class and that they were treated less favorably than non-members. They are not required to provide background circumstances or a pattern of conduct. The high Court agreed that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling went against McDonnell Douglas, by holding Ames to a higher standard.

Disparate treatment under Title VII occurs when an employer intentionally discriminates against an employee or job applicant based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. To prove disparate treatment, an individual must demonstrate that they were treated less favorably than others in similar circumstances solely because of their protected class. An employer cannot take an adverse employment action — such as firing, refusing to hire, demoting, refusing to promote, etc. — against an employee or applicant based on any of these protected characteristics.

The Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirms that all Title VII plaintiffs, regardless of group status, must be treated equally under the law. While most Title VII cases arise from minority group plaintiffs, this ruling makes it clear that reverse discrimination cases from majority group plaintiffs are also actionable under Title VII. Accordingly, it is likely that employers will see an uptick of reverse discrimination claims from employees who are majority group members.