The Seventh Circuit Heard Oral Argument on Whether “Text Messages” Are “Telephone Calls” Under the TCPA, Setting the Stage for a Potential Circuit Split With the Ninth Circuit

On May 21, 2026, a Seventh Circuit panel consisting of Judges Thomas K. Kirsch, Doris L. Pryor, and Nancy L. Maldonado heard oral argument in Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, Appeal No. 25-2398, to decide whether there is a private right of action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for the receipt of unwanted text messages. Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA provides a private right of action for any person “who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.” This appeal, as Judge Pryor stated, boiled down to a “purely statutory question”: Is a text message a “telephone call” under Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA?

Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit—in Howard v. Republican National Committee—answered that question in the affirmative, holding that text messages are calls under the TCPA. Now, the Seventh Circuit must provide its interpretation of the same provision. While questions and comments made by judges during oral argument are not always indicative of how they will rule, there seems to be momentum for a potential ruling at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision. A circuit split on this issue could lead to an appeal to the United States Supreme Court to provide the ultimate determination on this issue.

Background

In 2024, several plaintiffs filed class action complaints against Blackstone Medical Services, LLC (Blackstone) in various district courts around the country. Generally, they alleged that Blackstone—a Florida-based company that provides at-home sleep tests designed to diagnose sleep apnea—sent consumers unwanted text messages despite requests that the text messaging cease. Ultimately, these cases were consolidated in the Central District of Illinois.

On April 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint against Blackstone in the Central District of Illinois. On May 13, 2025, Blackstone moved to dismiss and the court granted the motion, holding that text messages are not covered by Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA. Final judgment was entered on August 21, 2025, and plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

In their opening brief, Plaintiffs made three principal legal arguments, specifically that 1) the statutory text and structure of the TCPA reveal “Congress’s intent… to cover all forms of telephonic communications” including text messages; 2) the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) “long-standing interpretation” of the TCPA includes text messages as calls; and 3) both “statutory and historical interpretation” support the view that text messages and calls both mean “to communicate with or try to communicate with a person by telephone.” Additionally, Plaintiffs made public policy arguments.

In their brief, Blackstone argued that the “ordinary meaning of ‘telephone call’ in 1999 when the TCPA was enacted did not include text messages.” Further, Blackstone argued that because other provisions within Section 227 “explicitly address text messages,” the absence of any reference to text messages within the TCPA’s private right of action section shows Congress’s intent to provide a private right of action for only telephone calls. Additionally, Blackstone argued that Plaintiffs’ reliance on the FCC’s interpretation is unpersuasive in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned Chevron.

Oral Argument

On May 21, 2026, the Seventh Circuit heard oral argument. The panel sought Plaintiffs’ position on the difference between text messages and telephone calls, and whether Congress’s understanding of telephone calls in 1991 encompassed the former. Further, Judge Pryor probed Plaintiffs’ counsel on Congress’s amendments in the late 2010s to certain provisions of Section 227 other than Section 227(c)(5), to explicitly include text messages, questioning why Section 227(c)(5) was not similarly amended, stating, “when Congress wanted to incorporate text messages, they knew how to do it.”

Judge Pryor probed Blackstone on whether Section 227(c)’s structure was meant to make telephone calls inclusive of text messages, focusing on the use of the word telephone solicitation within Section 227. In response, Blackstone’s lawyer stated this was a “heads we win, tails the other side loses” determination because telephone solicitation, while used in other subparts of Section 227, was not used in Section 227(c)(5), which was the provision at issue. Further, Judge Pryor questioned Blackstone on the interplay of the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA in a post-Chevron world.

Ultimately, based on the oral argument, Judge Kirsch and Judge Pryor, particularly the former, seemed poised to affirm the Central District of Illinois’s decision and hold that text messages are not telephone calls under the TCPA’s private right of action in Section 227(c)(5). However, that result is not guaranteed. Thus, we will continue to follow this matter and provide an update when the Seventh Circuit issues its ruling.