Text, Don't Call: Seventh Circuit Holds the TCPA's Private Right of Action Doesn't Reach Text Messages

As we predicted following oral argument in Steidinger v. Blackstone Med. Servs., No. 25-2398, the Seventh Circuit has held that § 227(c)(5) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) does not provide a private right of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages. Steidinger v. Blackstone Med. Servs., No. 25-2398, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 20613 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026). Consistent with the panel’s questioning at oral argument, a unanimous court affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims.

Background

The Plaintiffs are individuals who received marketing text messages from Blackstone Medical Services, a Florida-based company that provides at-home sleep tests. Plaintiffs allegedly received text messages even after asking the messages to stop and after they added themselves to the National Do-Not-Call Registry. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action complaint against Blackstone in the Central District of Illinois, alleging violations of the TCPA.

Blackstone moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims, arguing that § 227(c)(5) of the TCPA does not apply to text messages. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit explained that the appeal turned “on a single issue: whether text messages are telephone calls within the meaning of § 227(c)(5).” Id. at *3. The Court held that “[b]ased on the ordinary public meaning of telephone call at the time of the TCPA’s enactment, as well as the context provided by surrounding provisions of § 227, we find that texts are not calls, so § 227(c)(5) does not authorize the plaintiffs’ suit.” Id. It was, the Court observed, “undisputed that ‘telephone call’ couldn’t have been thought to cover text messages when the TCPA was enacted in 1991, because the first text message was not sent until the following year.” Id. at *4.

The Court’s analysis did not end there, stating, “‘[w]hile every statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment, new applications may arise in light of changes in the world.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court consulted contemporaneous dictionary definitions to assess what “telephone call” meant in 1991. First, in 1991, the Court found that a telephone was “[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.” Id. at *5 (citing to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary).  Second, in 1991, a call meant “to get or try to get into communication by telephone.” Id. Together, the Court found those definitions established that, in 1991, a “telephone call… referred to communication via sound.” Id. Because text messages do not reproduce sound, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that the “march of technology” should expand the meaning of “telephone call” to encompass text messages. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that the TCPA’s provisions surrounding § 227(c)(5) contemplated the regulation of messages with its use of the term “telephone solicitations” further evidencing that the private right of action section did not extend to text messages.

The Court then rejected the Plaintiffs’ reliance Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez wherein the Supreme Court had described a text message as qualifying as a “call.” The Seventh Circuit explained that this was not a substantive holding on the meaning of “call” and that analysis arose under § 227(b) not § 227(c)(5). Id. at *9. The Court similarly distinguished its own prior decisions and those of other circuits treating texts as calls, explaining that each involved § 227(b) not § 227(c)(5). Id. at *10.

The Court further rejected the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation that “call” includes text messages. Although the FCC has adopted that interpretation, the Court observed that it “has not engaged in rulemaking to define the term for the purpose of § 227(c)(5),” and that the FCC extended Do-Not-Call protections to text messages pursuant to § 227(c)(3) which concerned “telephone solicitations.” Id. at *11. In any event, the Court stated it was not bound by the FCC’s interpretation, which could not “override our conclusion about the meaning of § 227(c)(5).” Id. at *12.

The Court was likewise unpersuaded that Congress’s later revisions to § 227(b) confirmed that “calls” encompass text messages, explaining that the argument “fails at the first step” because § 227(b) and § 227(c)(5) contain materially different language. Id. at *14. Finally, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ policy arguments, reasoning that “Congress’s general concern about intrusive telemarketing practices doesn’t necessarily mean that it adopted a broad definition of telephone call.” Id. at *14-*15 (internal citation omitted). The Court emphasized that Congress found telemarketing calls “create a public safety risk when they seize telephone lines needed for emergency or medical assistance,” a risk that spam text messages “don’t pose.” Id. at *15.

The Court concluded that, although “[r]epeated, unwanted text messages are undoubtedly a nuisance… they do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5).” Id. Text messages, the Court explained, may instead be curbed “through agency action pursuant to other provisions of § 227.” Id. The Court accordingly affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims. Id.

What’s Next

The decision sharpens a divide over whether text messages qualify as “calls” under the TCPA. Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite practical result in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 164 F.4th 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2026), holding that “a text message is properly deemed to be a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA.” Id. For now, the ruling forecloses § 227(c)(5) claims premised on unwanted text messages in the Seventh Circuit. We will continue to monitor this matter and report on any further developments.